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THROWING ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION A 
LIFEVEST: PRESERVING JURISDICTION 
FOR MARITIME TORTS THAT DO NOT 
INVOLVE VESSELS 
Abstract: This Note examines the current test for establishing admiralty jurisdic-
tion for in personam tort suits and the lower courts’ recent departure from this test. 
Some lower courts have started to inappropriately read a vessel requirement into 
the test. This requirement causes a host of problems, including upsetting the spirit 
of the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act of 1948, forcing judges to decide is-
sues of fact at the outset of litigation, and inadequately upholding admiralty juris-
diction’s purpose of protecting maritime commerce. The best solution to this prob-
lem would be for Congress to pass a new admiralty jurisdiction statute that incor-
porates the 1948 Act and the Supreme Court’s current test for admiralty jurisdic-
tion, and explicitly states that a vessel’s involvement is not required to establish 
admiralty jurisdiction.  
INTRODUCTION 
Robert Duplechin and Terry Lee Sinclair both enjoyed recreational SCUBA 
diving.1 During one such dive, both Duplechin and Sinclair contracted “the 
bends”—a common diver ailment—allegedly due to negligent instruction and 
care.2 Duplechin sued the dive shop that taught him how to dive,3 and Sinclair 
sued the vessel that brought him to the dive location.4 Despite having similar 
claims, the federal court hearing Duplechin’s case denied admiralty jurisdiction,5 
whereas the federal court hearing Sinclair’s case granted jurisdiction.6 
The inequitable discrepancy between Duplechin’s and Sinclair’s cases is not 
uncommon under some lower federal courts’ improper application of the Su-
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Sinclair v. Soniform, Inc., 935 F.2d 599, 600 (3d Cir. 1991); Duplechin v. Prof’l Ass’n for 
Diving Instructors, 666 F. Supp. 84, 85 (E.D. La. 1987). 
 2 See Sinclair, 935 F.2d at 600; Duplechin, 666 F. Supp. at 85; infra note 147 and accompanying 
text (describing the bends). 
 3 Duplechin, 666 F. Supp. at 85. 
 4 Sinclair, 935 F.2d at 600. 
 5 See Duplechin, 666 F. Supp. at 88 (holding that diving does not involve vessels in navigation 
and thus denying admiralty jurisdiction). 
 6 See Sinclair, 935 F.2d at 600 (holding that the plaintiff’s allegations against the crew of a vessel 
arose from the crew “engag[ing] in a quintessential maritime activity affecting commerce—the 
transport and care of paying passengers” and thus granting jurisdiction). 
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preme Court’s and Congress’s guidelines for establishing admiralty jurisdiction.7 
Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction to resolve admiralty disputes.8 The cur-
rent test for establishing admiralty jurisdiction for in personam tort suits, as laid 
out by the U.S. Supreme Court and Congress, does not require a vessel to be in-
volved in the tort.9 Rather, the current test for admiralty jurisdiction includes both 
a location and a connection element.10 To satisfy the location element, the tort 
must occur on navigable water, or, if the injury occurred on land, then a vessel on 
navigable water must have caused the injury.11 To satisfy the connection element, 
the tort must be of the type that could potentially disrupt maritime commerce, and 
the type of activity that gave rise to the tort must bear a substantial relationship to 
traditional maritime activities.12 A strict application of this test may have granted 
Duplechin jurisdiction.13 Nevertheless, despite a vessel not being required for 
                                                                                                                           
 7 See, e.g., Bd. of Comm’rs v. M/V Belle of Orleans, 535 F.3d 1299, 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2008) 
(requiring the presence of a vessel for admiralty jurisdiction), abrogated by Lozman v. City of Riviera 
Beach Fla., 133 S. Ct. 735 (2013); De La Rosa v. St. Charles Gaming Co., 474 F.3d 185, 188 (5th Cir. 
2006) (same); Duplantis v. Northrop Grumman, No. 10-1575, 2012 WL 2369348, at *2–3 (W.D. La. 
June 20, 2012) (same); Miles v. VT Halter Marine, Inc., 792 F. Supp. 2d 919, 924 (E.D. La. 2011) 
(same); infra notes 86–116 and accompanying text (discussing how many lower courts have begun to 
inappropriately read a vessel requirement into the test for establishing admiralty jurisdiction).  
 8 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76–77. Claims may be brought in state court under 
the Judiciary Act’s “saving to suitors” clause. Norman M. Stockman, Admiralty Law for the Land-
Side Alabama Lawyer, 71 ALA. LAW. 296, 300 (2010); see Judiciary Act § 9. This clause allows 
plaintiffs who could sue in federal court under admiralty jurisdiction to bring suit in either state court 
or federal court under another theory of federal jurisdiction, such as diversity. Stockman, supra, at 
300. Nevertheless, state courts hearing claims under the saving to suitors clause must apply federal 
admiralty law. Id. 
 9 See Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30101 (2006) (expanding admiralty 
jurisdiction to include land-based injuries that are caused by a vessel on navigable water, but saying 
nothing about admiralty jurisdiction for injuries that occur on navigable water without a vessel); 
Grubart v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 534 (1995) (affirming the Supreme 
Court’s test for admiralty jurisdiction that was laid out in 1990 in Sisson v. Ruby, which does not re-
quire that a vessel be involved to establish jurisdiction); Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 360–67 (1990) 
(holding that to establish admiralty jurisdiction, the plaintiff must satisfy both a location and a connec-
tion test—neither of which requires a vessel’s presence); see also infra notes 62–65 and accompany-
ing text (explaining that Congress passed the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act to expand admi-
ralty jurisdiction while preserving admiralty jurisdiction for torts occurring on navigable water with-
out a vessel). In personam claims are made against individuals, such as a boat’s captain or owner, as 
opposed to in rem claims, which are made against the boat itself. Belle of Orleans, 535 F.3d at 1305; 
see Crimson Yachts v. Betty Lyn II Motor Yacht, 603 F.3d 864, 868 (11th Cir. 2010); infra note 26 
(discussing the differences between in personam and in rem suits further). 
 10 Grubart, 513 U.S. at 534; Sisson, 497 U.S. at 360–67. 
 11 Grubart, 513 U.S. at 534; Sisson, 497 U.S. at 360–61; see Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction 
Act § 30101. 
 12 Grubart, 513 U.S. at 534; Sisson, 497 U.S. at 361–67. 
 13 Compare Duplechin, 666 F. Supp. at 86 (explaining that the plaintiff contracted the bends 
while SCUBA diving in the navigable waters of the Gulf of Mexico), Hartley v. City of New York, 
621 N.Y.S.2d 789, 793–94 (Sup. Ct. 1994) (holding that injured SCUBA divers can potentially dis-
rupt maritime commerce), Phyllis G. Coleman, SCUBA Diving Injuries: Causes, Remedies, and De-
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admiralty jurisdiction, many lower courts, like the court hearing Duplechin’s suit, 
have started to insist that the tort involve a vessel to establish admiralty jurisdic-
tion.14 
This Note examines the consequences of introducing a vessel requirement 
to the admiralty jurisdiction test and argues that such a requirement undermines 
admiralty jurisdiction’s purpose.15 Part I describes admiralty jurisdiction’s pur-
pose and development into its current two-part test.16 Part II then examines how 
some lower courts have abandoned a strict application of this two-part test in 
favor of a vessel requirement test.17 Finally, Part III explains that requiring a 
vessel inadequately fulfills admiralty jurisdiction’s purpose of protecting mari-
time commerce.18 This Note asserts that a strict application of the current two-
part test better protects maritime commerce than a vessel requirement test and 
that Congress or the Supreme Court should intervene to prevent federal courts 
from requiring a vessel’s involvement for admiralty jurisdiction.19 
I. ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION’S PURPOSE AND DEVELOPMENT  
IN THE UNITED STATES 
This Part discusses admiralty jurisdiction’s role in the United States and 
how the Supreme Court and Congress have developed the current test for estab-
lishing admiralty jurisdiction.20 Section A explains that admiralty jurisdiction 
and admiralty law were created to protect maritime commerce because it re-
quires special protections.21 Section B then describes admiralty jurisdiction’s 
                                                                                                                           
fenses, 29 J. MAR. L. & COM. 519, 533–37 (1998) (discussing marine tourism, including SCUBA 
lessons and SCUBA tours), and id. at 537 n.126, 544 (explaining that most divers can satisfy the test 
for admiralty jurisdiction and noting that not all divers launch from vessels), with supra notes 9–12 
and accompanying text (outlining the current Supreme Court test for admiralty jurisdiction). 
 14 See De La Rosa, 474 F.3d at 188 (denying admiralty jurisdiction because a permanently 
moored floating casino involved in the incident was not a vessel); Duplantis, 2012 WL 2369348, at 
*2–3 (denying admiralty jurisdiction because the boat involved in the incident was incomplete and 
thus not a vessel); Miles, 792 F. Supp. 2d at 924 (denying admiralty jurisdiction because a barge under 
construction that was involved in the incident was not a vessel); David W. Robertson & Michael F. 
Sturley, Recent Developments in Admiralty and Maritime Law at the National Level and in the Fifth 
and Eleventh Circuits, 36 TUL. MAR. L.J. 425, 489 (2012); supra note 9–12 and accompanying text 
(illustrating how the current Supreme Court test for admiralty jurisdiction does not require the in-
volvement of a vessel). 
 15 See infra notes 20–172 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 20–85 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 86–116 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 117–172 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 117–172 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 21–85 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 23–46 and accompanying text. 
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dynamic development into the current two-part test that includes both a locality 
and a connection element.22 
A. Admiralty Jurisdiction: A Prerequisite for Applying Admiralty Law  
and Protecting Maritime Commerce 
To sue for relief under admiralty law, a claim must satisfy the test for admi-
ralty jurisdiction.23 This is because jurisdiction generally establishes a court’s 
power to resolve a dispute,24 and thus, admiralty jurisdiction is required to apply 
admiralty law.25 Admiralty law protects maritime commerce and its participants 
by governing conduct on navigable waters.26 If a court does not have admiralty 
jurisdiction, it cannot resolve a dispute involving admiralty law.27  
                                                                                                                           
 22 See infra notes 47–85 and accompanying text. 
 23 E. River S.S. Corp. v. TransAmerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 864 (1986) (“With admiralty 
jurisdiction comes the application of substantive admiralty law.”); see David W. Robertson, How the 
Supreme Court’s New Definition of “Vessel” Is Affecting Seaman Status, Admiralty Jurisdiction, and 
Other Areas of Maritime Law, 39 J. MAR. L. & COM. 115, 144 (2008) (noting that if a claim cannot 
establish admiralty jurisdiction, a federal court cannot apply admiralty law to the claim); Graydon S. 
Staring, The Admiralty Jurisdiction of Torts and Crimes and the Failed Search for Its Purpose, 38 J. 
MAR. L. & COM. 433, 453 (2007) (explaining that admiralty law accompanies admiralty jurisdiction); 
Stockman, supra note 8, at 298 (observing that with any admiralty issue, the parties must start by 
analyzing whether admiralty jurisdiction exists). Claims heard in state courts under admiralty law 
(pursuant to the saving to suitors clause) must also meet the federal test for admiralty jurisdiction 
before admiralty law will apply. See Stockman, supra note 8, at 300.  
 24 See Sisson, 497 U.S. at 375 (Scalia, J., concurring) (explaining that a court’s ruling is not bind-
ing if the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the suit (quoting Hanover Star Milling 
Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 426 (1916) (Holmes, J., concurring)); 1 STEVEN F. FRIEDELL, BENE-
DICT ON ADMIRALTY § 101, at 7-1 (7th rev. ed. 2013) (“Jurisdiction is the power to adjudicate a case 
upon its merits and dispose of it as justice may require.”). 
 25 See E. River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. at 864; Robertson, supra note 23, at 144; Staring, supra note 
23, at 453. 
 26 See Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 674 (1982) (explaining that admiralty ju-
risdiction’s purpose is to protect maritime commerce); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1055 (9th ed. 
2009) (defining “maritime law” as “[t]he body of law governing marine commerce and navigation, the 
carriage at sea of persons and property, and marine affairs in general; the rules governing contract, 
tort, and workers’-compensation or relating to commerce on or over water”). Note that the terms “ad-
miralty law” and “maritime law” are often used interchangeably. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 
supra, at 50 (failing to define admiralty law and instead directing readers to the definition of admiral-
ty, which is partially defined as “[t]he system of jurisprudence that has grown out of the practice of 
admiralty courts,” and the definition of maritime law). Admiralty law governs three types of cases: 
tort suits, contract suits, and workers’ compensation suits. Stockman, supra note 8, at 298. Federal 
courts apply a different test to each type of claim to determine if they have jurisdiction. Id. at 298, 
300. To establish admiralty jurisdiction for a maritime contract suit, the contract’s subject matter must 
be maritime in nature. Id. at 298 (quoting Misener Marine Constr., Inc. v. Norfolk Dredging Co., 594 
F.3d 832, 837 (11th Cir. 2010)). To establish a claim for workers’ compensation, the individual must 
qualify as a seaman under the Jones Act. 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2006 & Supp. V 2011); Stockman, supra 
note 8, at 300. This Note exclusively addresses the test for determining admiralty jurisdiction in tort 
suits. See infra notes 27–172 and accompanying text. 
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Admiralty law was created to protect maritime commerce because maritime 
commerce was essential to the early United States’ economy.28 Early colonies’ 
economies depended heavily on commercial maritime activities such as ship-
building, fishing, shipping, and whaling.29 Today, maritime commerce remains 
crucial to the United States’ economy and still necessitates admiralty law protec-
tion.30  
                                                                                                                           
 Admiralty tort suits may either be brought in personam or in rem. See, e.g., Am. Dredging Co. v. 
Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 446–47 (1994) (explaining the difference between in rem and in personam 
suits); Crimson, 603 F.3d at 868; Belle of Orleans, 535 F.3d at 1305. In personam suits and in rem 
suits have different, though overlapping requirements for establishing admiralty jurisdiction. See Am. 
Dredging, 510 U.S. at 446–47; Crimson, 603 F.3d at 868; Belle of Orleans, 535 F.3d at 1305–06. 
Specifically, to sue in rem, one must obtain a maritime lien on a boat. Crimson, 603 F.3d at 868; 
Stockman, surpa note 8, at 302. To obtain a maritime lien, the boat must be classified as a vessel. See 
Crimson, 603 F.3d at 868. As this Note explains, to sue in personam, a vessel does not have to be 
involved. See infra notes 117–172 and accompanying text (arguing that a vessel-based test inade-
quately protects maritime commerce). 
 27 See E. River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. at 864; Robertson, supra note 23, at 144; Staring, supra note 
23, at 453. 
 28 See Foremost, 457 U.S. at 674–75, 677 (explaining that the purpose of admiralty jurisdiction is 
“unquestionably” to protect maritime commerce and discussing the importance of broadly granting 
admiralty jurisdiction to protect this crucial industry); Price v. Price, 929 F.2d 131, 133 (4th Cir. 
1991) (stating that admiralty law developed to facilitate commercial shipping); Armand M. Paré, Jr., 
Admiralty Jurisdiction at the Millennium, 24 TUL. MAR. L.J. 187, 201–02 (1999) (arguing that recent 
Supreme Court cases involving admiralty jurisdiction reinforce the proposition that admiralty jurisdic-
tion was established to promote and protect maritime commerce); Ronen Perry, Differential Preemp-
tion, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 821, 823–25 (2011) (discussing the importance of maritime commerce to the 
United States’ economy); Staring, supra note 23, at 467–68 (discussing maritime commerce and stat-
ing that the need to protect maritime commerce is the historic and continued basis for admiralty law). 
 The United States was not the first civilization to develop admiralty law. See Gordon W. Paulsen, 
An Historical Overview of the Development of Uniformity in International Maritime Law, 57 TUL. L. 
REV. 1065, 1068 (1983) (discussing the Rhodian Sea Laws from 500 to 300 B.C.E.); Rod Sullivan, A 
Constitutional Approach to Maritime Personal Injury, 43 J. MAR. L. & COM. 393, 406 (2012) (dis-
cussing English admiralty courts that predated the American Revolution); Joseph C. Sweeney, The 
Silver Oar and Other Maces of the Admiralty: Admiralty Jurisdiction in America and the British Em-
pire, 38 J. MAR. L. & COM. 159, 159 (2007) (analyzing English maritime law from 1701). As far back 
as the Babylonians, societies have developed admiralty regulations. NICHOLAS J. HEALY ET AL., CAS-
ES AND MATERIALS ON ADMIRALTY 1 (5th ed. 1974); Paulsen, supra, at 1068. Similarly, the earliest 
European settlers in the Americas recognized that maritime commerce needed protection. See Staring, 
supra note 23, at 445 (explaining that the colonies established admiralty courts with broad admiralty 
jurisdiction); Sweeney, supra, at 163 (discussing how colonies created admiralty courts); see also 
Fabio Arcila, Jr., The Framers’ Search Power: The Misunderstood Statutory History of Suspicion & 
Probable Cause, 50 B.C. L. REV. 363, 379 (2009) (discussing the colonies’ vice-admiralty courts). 
 29 Maritime Commerce, NAT’L PARK SERV., http://www.nps.gov/nr/travel/maritime/commerce.
htm, archived at http://perma.cc/G5MG-TKY6 (last visited Mar. 23, 2014); Maritime Commerce, SEA 
GRANT, http://www.providenceri.com/narragansettbay/maritime_commerce.html, archived at http://
perma.cc/AFC6-ZSMB (last visited Mar. 23, 2014). 
 30 See Perry, supra note 28, at 823–25; Staring, supra note 23, at 467–68. See generally About the 
MLA, MAR. L. ASS’N, http://www.mlaus.org, archived at http://perma.cc/J587-S8ZQ (last visited 
Mar. 23, 2014) (explaining that the Maritime Law Association’s purpose remains “to advance reforms 
in the Maritime Law of the United States . . . to promote uniformity in its enactment and interpreta-
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Maritime commerce needs a unique body of law because its participants 
face unique difficulties.31 Admiralty law developed to address these unique per-
ils, which include injured seamen, maritime liens, vessel ownership, collisions, 
salvage, and pirates.32 In many instances, state statutes and state common law do 
not provide causes of action for injuries caused by these unique dangers, so a 
party that cannot establish admiralty jurisdiction may not have a remedy.33 In 
contrast, the Death on the High Seas Act and general maritime law provide 
wrongful death claims for victims that perish at sea, but only when admiralty 
jurisdiction is present.34 Additionally, admiralty law recognizes certain defenses, 
such as contributory negligence, that some states do not.35 As a final protection, 
                                                                                                                           
tion”). In 2012, fishing, forestry, and related activities in the United States generated over $34 billion 
in value. BEA: Gross-Domestic-Product-(GDP)-by-Industry Data, U.S. Department of Commerce, 
Bureau of Economic Analysis, http://www.bea.gov/industry/gdpbyind_data.htm, archived at http://
perma.cc/GN85-CXJL (last updated Feb. 14, 2014). That same year, water transportation generated 
over $14 billion in value—more than double the output it generated in 1998. Id. 
 31 See McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 354 (1991) (recognizing that seamen 
require special protection because of “the special hazards and disadvantages” seamen encounter); 
Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480, 483, 485 (C.C.D. Me. 1823) (No. 6047) (opining that “[s]eamen 
are by the peculiarity of their lives liable to sudden sickness from change of climate, exposure to per-
ils, and exhausting labour” and that “they are unprotected and need counsel”); Sweeney, supra note 
28, at 165 (noting that early admiralty cases involved seaman wage disputes, injuries, maritime liens, 
collisions, piracy, and other issues unique to maritime participants). See generally Foremost, 457 U.S. 
at 674–75 (discussing the importance of protecting maritime commerce). 
 32 See Sweeney, supra note 28, at 165. 
 33 Cf. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 392–91, 409 (1970) (establishing a 
wrongful death claim under general maritime law for wrongful deaths occurring within three nautical 
miles of the United States to offer more uniform protection to victims than state wrongful death stat-
utes provided); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 408–09 (1953) (noting that admiralty law 
has developed a “fairer and more flexible rule” regarding contributory negligence than Pennsylvania's 
common law approach and applying admiralty law’s rule so that a carpenter, who was injured while 
working on a vessel, could maintain his claim against the vessel owner despite his own negligence); 
Kuntz v. Windjammer “Barefoot” Cruises, Ltd., 573 F. Supp. 1277, 1284 (W.D. Pa. 1983) (holding 
that survivors can bring a survival action in general maritime law—a claim not available under many 
states’ statutes); Stockman, supra note 8, at 300 (noting that unlike Alabama, admiralty law recogniz-
es comparative fault). 
 34 See 46 U.S.C. § 30302 (2006) (providing a wrongful death claim under admiralty law for vic-
tims on the high seas more than three nautical miles away from the United States); Moragne, 398 U.S. 
at 392–91, 409 (providing a wrongful death claim under general maritime law for victims who perish 
within three nautical miles of the United States); see also Kuntz, 573 F. Supp. at 1284 (clarifying that 
a victim may be able to recover under a state’s wrongful death statute, but opining that admiralty law 
provides additional protections). 
 35 See Pope & Talbot, 346 U.S. at 408–09 (noting that admiralty law may be followed in lieu of 
Pennsylvania’s common law contributory negligence ban); Stockman, supra note 8, at 300 (compar-
ing admiralty law to Alabama’s common law). Five jurisdictions (Alabama, District of Columbia, 
Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia) still apply a pure contributory negligence rule, so if the plain-
tiff is even remotely to blame, he or she cannot recover anything if the law of one of those jurisdic-
tions applies. MATTHIESEN, WICKERT & LEHRER, S.C., CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE/COMPARATIVE 
FAULT LAWS IN ALL 50 STATES (rev. 2014), available at http://www.mwl-law.com/wp-content/
uploads/2013/03/contributory-negligence-comparative-fault-laws-in-all-50-states.pdf, archived at http://
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admiralty law’s statute of limitations for tort suits is three years, as compared to 
most states’ two-year statute of limitations.36 
Admiralty law must be uniform if it is to adequately protect maritime 
commerce.37 The Framers of the Constitution and Congress intended federal 
courts to have the exclusive power to resolve admiralty disputes to ensure uni-
formity because they believed that uniform laws best promoted and protected 
maritime commerce.38 Thus, to protect maritime commerce,39 Article III, Sec-
tion 2 of the Constitution and Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 grant feder-
al courts exclusive jurisdiction over civil suits that arise in admiralty and mari-
time jurisdiction.40 
                                                                                                                           
perma.cc/R7FV-N9LH. Thirty-three states apply a modified comparative fault rule, so if the plaintiff 
is more than fifty or fifty-one percent at fault, then he or she cannot collect any damages. Id. 
 36 Stockman, supra note 8, at 300. 
 37 See Lizabeth L. Burrell, Current Problems in Maritime Uniformity, 5 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 67, 69 
(1992); Perry, supra note 28, at 824; Thomas S. Rue, The Uniqueness of Admiralty and Maritime 
Law, 79 TUL. L. REV. 1127, 1147 (2005). 
 38 Rue, supra note 37, at 1147–48 (explaining that the Constitution’s drafters granted exclusive 
admiralty jurisdiction to federal courts to promote uniformity); see Staring, supra note 23, at 455–56 
(stating that the Framers understood that leaving admiralty law to each state would be “impractical” 
and “disorderly”); Sullivan, supra note 28, at 408–10 (describing Alexander Hamilton’s belief that 
state courts were less competent to hear admiralty cases, which often depended on international law). 
The Supreme Court’s right to hear admiralty claims does appear to have been debated during the Con-
stitutional Convention. Staring, supra note 23, at 456 (noting that James Madison only mentions ad-
miralty law twice in his copious notes on the Convention). After the Convention, Alexander Hamil-
ton—a maritime attorney—wrote about federal admiralty jurisdiction’s acceptance in the Federalist 
papers. THE FEDERALIST NOS. 80, at 478 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“The 
most bigoted idolizers of state authority have not thus far shown a disposition to deny the national 
judiciary the cognizance of maritime causes.”).  
 39 See Rue, supra note 37, at 1147–48 (noting that the founders and Congress granted exclusive 
jurisdiction for admiralty suits to promote uniform admiralty law); Staring, supra note 23, at 455–56 
(noting that the founders did not heavily debate granting federal courts jurisdiction over admiralty 
issues and stating that it would have been “impractical” and “disorderly” to fragment admiralty law 
over the many states). 
 40 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76–77. See general-
ly State ex rel. Guste v. MN Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1032 (5th Cir. 1985) (opining that maritime 
commerce is best protected by uniform admiralty laws); David J. Bederman & John E. Weirwille, The 
Contemporary Contours of Admiralty Jurisdiction, 31 TUL. MAR. L.J. 291, 292 (2007) (noting that 
admiralty jurisdiction is the only specific grant of subject matter jurisdiction). Article III, Section 2 of 
the Constitution allows the Supreme Court and lower federal courts to hear “all cases of admiralty and 
maritime jurisdiction.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 established the 
lower federal courts and granted the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over civil suits that arise in 
“admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, including all seizures under laws of impost, navigation or trade 
of the United States, where the seizures are made, on waters which are navigable from the sea by 
vessels of ten or more tons burthen, . . . as well as upon the high seas.” Judiciary Act § 9. Congress 
codified these rights in 28 U.S.C. § 1333, which grants federal courts “original jurisdiction” of “[a]ny 
civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (2012). Admiralty jurisdiction is 
a form of subject matter jurisdiction, like diversity jurisdiction and federal question jurisdiction. See 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1332 (2012); Bederman & Weirwille, supra, at 292 (explaining that admiralty 
jurisdiction was the only specific grant of subject matter jurisdiction in the Constitution). Subject 
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Exclusive federal admiralty jurisdiction attempts to ensure that admiralty 
law is applied uniformly.41 For example, because a court must have admiralty 
jurisdiction to apply admiralty law, federal courts have the exclusive power to 
interpret admiralty law.42 One scholar notes that uniformity allows for the most 
administrable, fair, and predictable application of admiralty law.43 An admin-
istrable, fair, and predictable system best protects maritime commerce because it 
reduces the costs of litigation and statutory compliance, creates legitimacy by 
resolving analogous cases in the same manner, and allows economic planning 
and contracting of risk.44 Furthermore, scholars and courts reason that uniform 
admiralty law within the United States promotes uniformity of admiralty law on 
a global scale.45 Global uniformity decreases the costs of participating in mari-
time commerce and promotes peace among maritime nations.46 
                                                                                                                           
matter jurisdiction determines the power of a federal court to hear a case. See Bederman & Weirwille, 
supra, at 292 (explaining that courts can only adjudicate issues that they have power over). Because 
admiralty jurisdiction establishes a court’s power to hear a case, a proper test for determining whether 
a court has admiralty jurisdiction is necessary to avoid wasting judicial resources. See Sisson, 497 
U.S. at 375 (Scalia, J., concurring) (warning that a test for admiralty jurisdiction that creates uncer-
tainty would waste judicial resources by requiring courts to mistakenly try cases over which they lack 
jurisdiction (quoting Hanover, 240 U.S. at 426 (Holmes, J., concurring))). Without a clear test for 
admiralty jurisdiction, lengthy and expensive cases could be tried, only to be later reversed for lack of 
jurisdiction. See id. (stating that “a trial judge ought to be able to tell easily and fast what belongs in 
his court and what has no business there”). 
 41 Rue, supra note 37, at 1147–48; see Staring, supra note 23, at 455–56. 
 42 See Judiciary Act § 9 (vesting exclusive jurisdiction over admiralty suits in federal courts); 
Staring, supra note 23, at 453 (explaining that admiralty law accompanies admiralty jurisdiction); 
Stockman, supra note 8, at 298 (observing that with any admiralty issue, the parties must start by 
analyzing whether admiralty jurisdiction exists). But see S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 
(1917) (stating that state legislatures can affect admiralty law in some situations), superseded by stat-
ute, Longshoreman and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-576, 86 Stat. 
1251 (1927) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901–950 (2006)), as recognized in Dir., Office of 
Workers’ Comp. Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Perini N. River Assocs., 459 U.S. 297 (1983); 
Bederman & Wierwille, supra note 40, at 292 (explaining that due to the saving to suitors clause, state 
courts can influence admiralty law in some contexts). 
 43 Perry, supra note 28, at 857–58. 
 44 See id. 
 45 Robert D. Peltz, The Myth of Uniformity in Maritime Law, 21 TUL. MAR. L.J. 103, 121 (1996) 
(discussing the need for uniformity in the United States to promote international uniformity in admi-
ralty law); see The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 572 (1874) (observing that although each 
country may form its own maritime regulations, with regard to admiralty law, “there should be a uni-
form law founded on natural reason and justice”); Sullivan, supra note 28, at 409–10 (discussing Al-
exander Hamilton’s insistence that federal courts have exclusive power to administer admiralty law to 
ensure conformity with international law). 
 46 See Sullivan, supra note 28, at 409 (explaining Alexander Hamilton’s position that granting 
federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over admiralty issues would promote peace with foreign countries 
because federal judges were better qualified to apply international standards than state juries); The 
Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 572–73 (emphasizing the convenience of uniformity for participat-
ing in maritime commerce); cf. id. (discussing the need for uniform maritime law because maritime 
commerce was an international commercial interaction); Patrick Griggs, Uniformity of Maritime 
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B. Congress and the Supreme Court Develop a Test for  
Admiralty Jurisdiction to Address New Perils  
That Threaten Maritime Commerce 
The test for admiralty jurisdiction has continuously developed.47 Federal 
courts had to develop a test for establishing admiralty jurisdiction because nei-
ther the Founders nor Congress specified what admiralty jurisdiction entailed 
under the Constitution or the Judiciary Act of 1789.48 
Originally, the courts established a locality test for admiralty jurisdiction 
over maritime tort suits based exclusively on the location of the tort.49 To estab-
lish admiralty jurisdiction, the tort had to have occurred on the “high seas” or 
within the “ebb and flow of the tide.”50 The ebb and flow of the tide originally 
only included waters closely connected to the ocean, but as river transportation 
increased, federal courts expanded the interpretation of the tides’ flow upstream 
to include rivers.51 Eventually, in 1851, the Supreme Court held that Congress’s 
grant of admiralty jurisdiction to the federal courts pertained to all public navi-
gable water, thereby also including lakes and rivers that did not wax and wane 
with the tides.52 Thereafter, the Supreme Court held that water is navigable if it 
may be used in commerce.53 
                                                                                                                           
Law—An International Perspective, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1551, 1553 (1999) (discussing modern nations’ 
need to balance national regulations with international solutions); Peltz, supra note 45, at 121 (de-
scribing maritime commerce’s international nature). 
 47 See infra notes 48–85 and accompanying text. 
 48 See Paré, supra note 28, at 189 (explaining that after adopting the Constitution, federal courts 
still looked to English admiralty law to develop rules for admiralty jurisdiction); Robert C. Adams, 
Note, Vaguely Refining Admiralty Tort Jurisdiction: Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & 
Dock Co., 20 TUL. MAR. L.J. 163, 164 (1995) (explaining that admiralty jurisdiction had to develop 
through case law because neither Congress nor the Constitution laid out a clear test). 
 49 See Thomas v. Lane, 23 F. Cas. 957, 960 (C.C.D. Me. 1833) (No. 13,902) (characterizing this 
as the general test that courts applied). 
 50 Id. 
 51 See Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441, 497 (1847) (Woodbury, J., dissenting) (describing 
this approach taken by federal courts). 
 52 The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 443–44, 457 (1851). 
 53 See, e.g., The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430, 436 (1874); The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 
Wall.) 557, 563 (1870), superseded by statute, Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 502(7), 86 Stat. 816, 886 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) 
(2006 & Supp. V 2011)), as recognized in Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006). In 1870, in 
The Daniel Ball, the Supreme Court held that to satisfy the locality test, the waterway must be “navi-
gable in fact.” 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) at 563 (defining “navigable in fact” as “used, or are susceptible of 
being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or 
may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water”). Four years later, in the 1874 
case The Montello, the Supreme Court acknowledged that to be navigable, the waterway must be 
capable of being used for commerce. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 431, 434, 440; see also id. (noting that 
waterways were navigable even if the waterways were only navigable due to locks, damns, or other 
artificial constructions). 
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The judicial locality test stood as the test for admiralty jurisdiction for 
more than a century until Congress passed the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdic-
tion Act in 1948 (the “1948 Act”).54 Congress passed the 1948 Act to resolve 
an inequity that had developed in admiralty jurisdiction over the previous cen-
tury.55 In 1865, in The Plymouth, the Supreme Court held that claims concern-
ing a fire that started on a vessel on navigable water and spread to facilities on 
land could not establish admiralty jurisdiction.56 The Court opined that the 
whole injury caused by the tortious act had to occur on navigable water or “at 
least, the substance and consummation” had to be on navigable water to estab-
lish admiralty jurisdiction.57 The Plymouth’s substance and consummation rule 
often led to inequitable results.58 Under this rule, courts granted jurisdiction if 
the breach and injury occurred on navigable water.59 At the same time, courts 
                                                                                                                           
 54 See Pub. L. No. 80-695, 62 Stat. 496, 496 (1948) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. § 30101 
(2006)); Grubart, 513 U.S. at 531–32 (explaining that the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act 
expanded the traditional locality test to include torts involving a vessel that caused injury on land). 
 55 David W. Robertson & Michael F. Sturley, The Admiralty Extension Act Solution, 34 J. MAR. 
L. & COM. 209, 245–46 (2003). See generally infra notes 56–60 and accompanying text (discussing 
this inequity). 
 56 See 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20, 21, 36–37 (1865), superseded by statute, 62 Stat. at 496 (codified as 
amended at 46 U.S.C. § 30101), as recognized in Grubart, 513 U.S. 527. 
 57 See id. at 35–36. In The Plymouth, the Court reasoned that “[t]he locality is the entire field” and 
includes all the individual aspects of the tort, such as where the tortious act occurred and where the 
victim was injured. Id. at 28, 36. Posing a metaphor, the Court asked: 
Where is the locality of the sunbeam? In the mighty orb from which it parts? or in the 
boundless track through which it passes? or on the earth which it animates with life, and 
health, and warmth? In no one, assuredly, alone. All are but parts of one stupendous 
whole . . . . 
Id. at 28.  
 58 See Robertson & Sturley, supra note 55, at 245–46 (explaining that under The Plymouth, if a 
bridge and vessel collided due to the fault of the bridge, the vessel owner could sue the bridge in ad-
miralty—but if the vessel were at fault, the bridge owner could not sue the vessel in admiralty); Ad-
ams, supra note 48, at 165 (discussing how under The Plymouth, victims who were injured on naviga-
ble water by torts occurring on land could bring suit under admiralty law—but land victims could not 
do the same for torts commissioned on navigable water); see also The Admiral Peoples, 295 U.S. 649, 
652–53 (1935) (explaining that it should not matter for establishing admiralty jurisdiction in a slip and 
fall case on a vessel’s gangplank whether the victim lands in the water or on land); Staring, supra note 
23, at 480 (noting that under The Plymouth’s locality test, a court may grant admiralty jurisdiction if a 
seaman falls off a vessel in navigable water onto a dock, but may have to deny admiralty jurisdiction 
if the seaman falls off a vessel onto land). 
 59 See The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) at 35–36; Adams, supra note 48, at 165; see also The 
Admiral Peoples, 295 U.S. at 652–53 (discussing lower federal courts’ observations of the inequitable 
results produced by The Plymouth). 
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denied jurisdiction when the breach of duty occurred on navigable water but 
the injury occurred on land.60  
The 1948 Act solved this inequity by granting admiralty jurisdiction if the 
tort occurred on navigable water, or if a vessel on navigable water caused an 
injury on land.61 Congress passed the 1948 Act to expand admiralty jurisdic-
tion.62 The 1948 Act modified, but did not overrule, the Supreme Court’s locali-
ty rule.63 To satisfy the locality test after 1948, the tort had to either occur on 
navigable water or, if the injury occurred on land, the injury had to have been 
caused by a vessel in navigable water.64 In passing the 1948 Act, Congress in-
tended to extend admiralty jurisdiction to victims who were injured while on 
land by vessels on navigable water.65 
                                                                                                                           
 60 See The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) at 35–36; Adams, supra note 48, at 165; see also The 
Admiral Peoples, 295 U.S. at 652–53 (discussing lower federal courts’ observations of the inequitable 
results produced by The Plymouth). 
 61 See Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, Pub. L. No. 80-695, 62 Stat. 496, 496 (1948) 
(codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. § 30101 (2006)). When passed, the 1948 Act stated, “The admiral-
ty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States shall extend to and include all cases of damage or 
injury, to person or property, caused by a vessel on navigable water, notwithstanding that such dam-
age or injury be done or consummated on land.” Id. Although the Act is still in effect, Congress slight-
ly changed its language in 2006. Act of Oct. 6, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-304, sec. 6(c), § 30101, 120 
Stat. 1485, 1509 (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. § 30101). In relevant part, the Act now states, 
“The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States extends to and includes cases of injury 
or damage, to person or property, caused by a vessel on navigable waters, even though the injury or 
damage is done or consummated on land.” Id. § 30101(a). 
 62 See Gebhard v. S.S. Hawaiian Legislator, 425 F.2d 1303, 1309 (9th Cir. 1970); Robertson & 
Sturley, supra note 55, at 245–47, 249; Staring, supra note 23, at 480; see also Grubart, 513 U.S. at 
532 (explaining that the purpose of the Act was to eliminate the inequitable line between land and 
water when a vessel causes injury on land); Exec. Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 
249, 260 (1972) (noting that the Act was specifically passed to bring scenarios where vessels cause 
damage on land into admiralty law’s protection). Scholars debate whether the 1948 Act should be read 
as adding to the Supreme Court’s locality test analysis or whether it establishes a wholly separate test 
for establishing admiralty jurisdiction. See infra note 84 (discussing this debate and noting that most 
courts and scholars believe that the 1948 Act adds to the Supreme Court’s locality test analysis and 
does not establish a separate test for establishing admiralty jurisdiction). 
 63 See Grubart, 513 U.S. at 531–32 (observing that Congress passed the 1948 Act “to end concern 
over the sometimes confusing line between land and water, by investing admiralty jurisdiction over 
‘all cases’ where injury was caused by a ship or other vessel on navigable water; even if such injury 
occurred on land”); Adams, supra note 48, at 165 (explaining that the 1948 Act overruled The Plym-
outh’s holding but not The Plymouth’s locality test). See generally supra note 58 and accompanying 
text (discussing the inequities that resulted under a strict application of The Plymouth’s locality test). 
 64 See 46 U.S.C. § 30101; Grubart, 513 U.S. at 532, 534; Adams, supra note 48, at 169. Further-
more, in 1963, in Gutierrez v. Waterman Steamship Corp., the Supreme Court held that the 1948 Act 
should be interpreted broadly to include damages and injuries caused by a vessel or by the vessel’s 
personnel. 373 U.S. 206, 209–10 (1963) (reasoning that there was “no distinction in admiralty be-
tween torts committed by the ship itself and by the ship’s personnel while operating it”). 
 65 Exec. Jet, 409 U.S. at 260; Staring, supra note 23, at 480. Examples of vessels on navigable 
water causing damage on land include vessels colliding with a pier or bridge and fires on vessels 
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After Congress passed the 1948 Act, the Supreme Court further reshaped 
the test for admiralty jurisdiction through four landmark decisions.66 Generally, 
in these decisions, the Supreme Court addressed the modern uses of navigable 
waters, especially the use of pleasure vessels and overseas air transportation, 
both of which presented new perils to maritime commerce.67 These four cases 
produced the modern two-part test for admiralty jurisdiction for in personam tort 
suits,68 which now includes both a locality element and a connection element.69 
First, in 1972 in Executive Jet Aviation v. City of Cleveland, the Supreme 
Court held that to establish admiralty jurisdiction for suits involving aviation 
crashes on navigable waters, the claim must satisfy the locality test, and the ac-
tivities giving rise to the tort must bear a significant relationship to traditional 
maritime activities.70 The Court held that an airplane that hit a flock of seabirds 
and crashed in Lake Erie, a navigable waterway, did not bear a significant rela-
tionship to traditional maritime activities and, thus, did not warrant admiralty 
jurisdiction.71 Despite this holding, the Court did not establish an explicit test to 
determine what would qualify as a traditional maritime activity.72 The opinion 
emphasized, however, that to be considered a traditional activity, the activity 
must be of the type that admiralty law was developed to address.73 The Court 
noted that a plane predominantly flying over land that crashed and sank in navi-
gable water did not bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activi-
                                                                                                                           
spreading to land. See, e.g., Sisson, 497 U.S. at 360 (vessel fire); The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) at 
20 (same); Empire Seafoods, Inc. v. Anderson, 398 F.2d 204, 207 (5th Cir. 1968) (vessel collision). 
 66 See, e.g., Grubart, 513 U.S. at 534 (enumerating the current test for admiralty jurisdiction); 
Sisson, 497 U.S. at 360–67; Foremost, 457 U.S. at 669, 673, 677; Exec. Jet, 409 U.S. at 268; infra 
notes 67–85 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court’s four recent landmark admiralty 
jurisdiction decisions). 
 67 See Grubart, 513 U.S. at 529 (involving a barge that allegedly weakened and collapsed a pier); 
Sisson, 497 U.S. at 360 (involving claims stemming from a fire that started on a pleasure vessel in a 
marina, damaging the marina and other pleasure vessels); Foremost, 457 U.S. at 668 (analyzing a 
collision between two pleasure vessels); Exec. Jet, 409 U.S. at 254–55 (analyzing admiralty jurisdic-
tion’s application to a plane crash in navigable water and noting that The Plymouth’s locality test 
developed before anything other than commercial vessels was involved in maritime torts). Note that 
“[a] pleasure vessel is any vessel not engaged in maritime commerce.” Hechinger v. Caske, 890 F.2d 
202, 207 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 68 See infra notes 69–85 and accompanying text (discussing the admiralty jurisdiction test’s evo-
lution over the last half century). 
 69 See Grubart, 513 U.S. at 534. 
 70 409 U.S. at 268 (reasoning that adding a significant relationship prong to the traditional locality 
test better honored admiralty jurisdiction’s “history and purpose”). 
 71 Id. at 250, 273–74. 
 72 See id. at 269–71 (analyzing the specific facts of Executive Jet without establishing a broad 
holding beyond the facts at hand). 
 73 See id. 
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ties because the plane’s activities and crash were not related to the work or sink-
ing of a vessel.74  
Ten years later, in 1982, in Foremost Insurance Co. v. Richardson, the Su-
preme Court extended the reasoning in Executive Jet to all admiralty suits by 
holding that to establish admiralty jurisdiction, the tort must satisfy the locality 
test, and the activity that the parties were engaged in at the time of the injury 
must bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activities.75 In Fore-
most, the Supreme Court held that claims surrounding a collision between two 
pleasure vessels met both the locality and significant relationship tests and there-
fore satisfied admiralty jurisdiction.76 The Court clarified that even though admi-
ralty jurisdiction’s primary purpose is to protect maritime commerce, admiralty 
jurisdiction is not limited to vessels participating in maritime commerce.77 The 
Court reasoned that such a limitation would not sufficiently protect all maritime 
commerce because entities not engaged in maritime commerce can still adverse-
ly affect participants.78  
In 1990, in Sisson v. Ruby, the Supreme Court added the final prong to the 
test for admiralty jurisdiction—evaluating whether the tort had the potential to 
disrupt maritime commerce.79 The Court held that to establish admiralty juris-
diction, the tort must have occurred on navigable water, the activities giving rise 
to the tort had to bear a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activities, 
and the tort must have had the potential to disrupt maritime commerce. 80 Taken 
                                                                                                                           
 74 Id. at 250, 269–70, 273 (explaining that this case was only “fortuitously and incidentally con-
nected to navigable waters”). 
 75 457 U.S. at 673. A literal reading of Executive Jet would limit the case’s holding to aviation 
torts. Id.; see Exec. Jet, 409 U.S. at 268; Adams, supra note 48, at 167. 
 76 457 U.S. at 669, 677. 
 77 Id. at 674–75; see Paré, supra note 28, at 201–02. 
 78 Foremost, 457 U.S. at 674–75 (noting that “the failure to recognize the breadth of this federal 
interest ignores the potential effect of noncommercial maritime activity on maritime commerce”). 
 79 See 497 U.S. at 360–67. The case involved claims surrounding a fire that started on a pleasure 
vessel in a marina and damaged only the marina and other pleasure vessels. See id. at 360. The Court 
held that the suit could be brought in admiralty jurisdiction. See id. at 367. 
 80 See id. at 360–67. The Court reasoned that the marina was navigable water, maritime fires 
could disrupt maritime commerce, and storing vessels in a marina bore a significant relationship to 
maritime activity. See id. at 367. Furthermore, in Sisson, the Court explicitly rejected a fact-specific 
test regarding the tort’s impact on maritime commerce. Id. at 363 (insisting that the tort’s general 
character and not its actual affect should determine whether the tort could impact maritime com-
merce). Thus, parties do not have to show that maritime commerce was disrupted, rather, parties must 
simply show that it could have been disrupted. Id. Similarly, the Court in Sisson also adopted a broad 
test for assessing whether the activity involved bears a substantial relationship with traditional mari-
time activity. Id. at 364–65. The Court explained that the activity should be defined by its general 
character and not by the particular parties’ acts. Id. The Court also rejected the proposition that only 
navigation is substantially related to traditional maritime activities. Id. at 365–67 (reasoning that such 
a narrow application would not serve the purpose of admiralty jurisdiction: to protect maritime com-
merce). 
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together, the substantial relationship prong and the disruption prong make up the 
connection element. 81 Thus, after Sisson, the test for admiralty jurisdiction was a 
two-part test with a location and a connection element. 82  
Five years later, in the 1995 case Grubart v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock 
Co., the Supreme Court reaffirmed the two-part locality and connection test.83 
Henceforth, to satisfy the location element, the tort must have occurred on navi-
gable water or, if the injury occurred on land, the injury must have been caused 
by a vessel on navigable water.84 To satisfy the connection element, the tort must 
be of the type that would potentially interfere with maritime commerce and the 
general character of the activity giving rise to the incident must bear a substantial 
relationship to traditional maritime activity.85 
II. THE INTRODUCTION OF A VESSEL REQUIREMENT: THE LOWER COURTS’ 
DEPARTURE FROM THE SUPREME COURT’S TEST FOR  
ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION 
Courts and academics alike have struggled to apply the two-part test for 
admiralty jurisdiction.86 Recall that the Supreme Court has laid out the current 
two-part test for admiralty jurisdiction, which includes both a location and a 
connection element, twice: in 1990 in Sisson v. Ruby, and in 1995 in Grubart v. 
                                                                                                                           
 81 Grubart, 513 U.S. at 534; see Sisson, 497 U.S. at 363–65. 
 82 Grubart, 513 U.S. at 534; see Sisson, 497 U.S. at 360, 363–65.  
 83 513 U.S. at 534. In Grubart, the Court applied the locality and connection test and affirmed 
that the federal district court had admiralty jurisdiction over claims by a barge owner for limitation of 
liability after the barge allegedly weakened a pier while driving piles and caused the pier to collapse 
and flood Chicago. Id. at 529, 548. 
 84 Id. at 534. Most courts and academics believe that the Supreme Court synthesized the tradition-
al location test and the 1948 Act in Grubart to establish a two-part locality element—either the tort 
must occur on navigable water or, if the tort occurs on land, then the tort must be caused by a vessel—
in addition to the connection element. See Crotwell v. Hockman-Lewis Ltd., 734 F.2d 767, 768 (11th 
Cir. 1984) (noting that to satisfy the 1948 Act, the plaintiff also had to satisfy the Supreme Court’s 
connection element); Sohyde Drilling & Marine Co. v. Coastal States Gas Producing Co., 644 F.2d 
1132, 1135 (5th Cir. 1981) (same); Robertson & Sturley, supra note 55, at 239–40 (explaining that 
most courts believe that the locality test under Grubart incorporates the 1948 Act, but noting that 
some courts still maintain that the 1948 Act created a separate basis for admiralty jurisdiction); Ernest 
A. Young, Preemption at Sea, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273, 280–81 (1999) (noting that the 1948 Act 
expanded the traditional locality test); Adams, supra note 48, at 165 (same); cf. Grubart, 513 U.S. at 
534 (citing Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, Pub. L. No. 80-695, 62 Stat. 496, 496 (1948) 
(codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. § 30101 (2006)). Some scholars, however, still claim that the Act 
provides an independent basis for admiralty jurisdiction. See Robertson & Sturley, supra note 55, at 
239–41. Advocates for a separate basis argue that if a tortious injury on land was caused by a vessel 
on navigable water, then admiralty jurisdiction is satisfied under the 1948 Act, and the court does not 
have to conduct the Sisson-Grubart connection test. Id. 
 85 Grubart, 513 U.S. at 534. 
 86 See infra notes 87–116 and accompanying text (discussing how some lower courts have inap-
propriately started requiring the tort to involve a vessel to establish admiralty jurisdiction). 
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Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.87 Despite synthesizing the modern test for ad-
miralty jurisdiction, the Grubart Court provided little guidance to lower courts 
on how to apply the test, especially regarding what level of generality to use 
when describing the activity and the tort.88 In the wake of Sisson and Grubart, 
some lower courts have attempted to simplify and narrow the test for admiralty 
jurisdiction.89  
Specifically, in response to the struggle to apply the Sisson-Grubart test, 
these lower courts have begun to limit admiralty jurisdiction to claims involving 
vessels.90 For example, some lower courts have tried to simplify the Sisson-
Grubart test by combining the two aspects of the location element into one ques-
tion: did the tort involve a vessel on navigable water?91 And at least one lower 
court has tried to simplify the connection element by reasoning that only torts 
involving vessels could disrupt maritime commerce or that only activities con-
                                                                                                                           
 87 See Grubart v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 534 (1995); Sisson v. Ruby, 
497 U.S. 358, 360–67 (1990). See generally supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text (outlining the 
current test for establishing admiralty jurisdiction for in personam tort suits). 
 88 See 513 U.S. at 534, 538–39 (providing no explicit direction beyond instructing courts to clas-
sify the tort and activity at a level of generality); Robertson & Sturley, supra note 55, at 221–23 (dis-
cussing the problems in applying the connection element of the two-part test because a court cannot be 
certain what level of generality to use to describe the activity and tort); Adams, supra note 48, at 171–
72 (observing that “the Court [in Grubart] did not adequately define the potential disruption and sub-
stantial relationship elements of the jurisdictional formula,” and that “[t]hese elements are too vague 
to be consistently applied by the lower courts”). In Grubart, Justice Clarence Thomas argued in a 
concurring opinion that: “The fact that we have had to revisit this question [the test for admiralty ju-
risdiction] for the third time in a little over 10 years indicates the defects of the Court’s current ap-
proach.” 513 U.S. at 549 (Thomas, J., concurring). In accord with Justice Thomas’s fears, scholars 
have described courts’ uncertainty surrounding the correct level of generality to apply to the connec-
tion element of the test as the “Goldilocks requirement.” See Robertson and Sturley, supra note 55, at 
222 (lamenting that the courts will be searching for a characterization that is “just right”).  
 89 See, e.g., Bd. of Comm’rs v. M/V Belle of Orleans, 535 F.3d 1299, 1305–06, 1313 (11th Cir. 
2008) (reading a vessel requirement into the test for admiralty jurisdiction), abrogated by Lozman v. 
City of Riviera Beach Fla., 133 S. Ct. 735 (2013); De La Rosa v. St. Charles Gaming Co., 474 F.3d 
185, 187–88 (5th Cir. 2006) (same); Duplantis v. Northrop Grumman, No. 10-1575, 2012 WL 
2369348, at *3 (W.D. La. June 20, 2012) (same); Miles v. VT Halter Marine, Inc., 792 F. Supp. 2d 
919, 924 (E.D. La. 2011) (same); infra notes 90–116 and accompanying text (discussing these cases). 
 90 See Belle of Orleans, 535 F.3d at 1305–06, 1313; De La Rosa, 474 F.3d at 187–88; Duplantis, 
2012 WL 2369348, at *3; Miles, 792 F. Supp. 2d at 924. See generally Robertson, supra note 23, 
145–47 (analyzing the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s 2006 decision in De La Rosa v. St. 
Charles Gaming Co. and concluding that the court should not have read a vessel requirement into the 
location test); Robertson & Sturley, supra note 14, at 489 (explaining that a vessel is not required for 
admiralty jurisdiction). 
 91 See, e.g., Belle of Orleans, 535 F.3d at 1305–06, 1313; De La Rosa, 474 F.3d at 186–88; Miles 
792 F. Supp. 2d at 920–21, 924. See generally Grubart, 513 U.S. at 534 (explaining that the location 
element involves two aspects: either the tort—cause and injury—must occur on navigable water, or, if 
the injury occurred on land, then a vessel on navigable water must have caused the injury); Sisson, 
497 U.S. at 360–61 (same). 
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cerning vessels could bear a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activ-
ity.92 
The lower courts seem to ground their vessel requirement on the concur-
rences in Sisson and Grubart.93 The Sisson and Grubart concurrences opined 
that a multipart test was too complicated.94 Instead, the concurrences advocated 
for an admiralty jurisdiction test based on whether a vessel on navigable water 
caused the tort.95 In Sisson, the concurrence noted that all torts involving vessels 
on navigable water should warrant admiralty jurisdiction.96 The Sisson concur-
rence, however, did not foreclose the possibility of granting admiralty jurisdic-
tion to torts not involving vessels.97 Rather, the Sisson concurrence argued that 
the substantial relationship test, which requires that the activities giving rise to 
the tort bear a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activities, should 
only be used for non-vessel-related torts.98  
Nevertheless, some lower courts have begun to break from a strict applica-
tion of the Sisson-Grubart test by altering the location element to evaluate 
whether the tort occurred on a vessel in navigable water rather than exclusively 
analyzing whether the tort occurred on navigable water.99 For example, in 2006, 
in De La Rosa v. St. Charles Gaming Co., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit held that the fact that a tort occurred on navigable water was insufficient 
to establish admiralty jurisdiction.100 Rather, the court required that the tort spe-
                                                                                                                           
 92 See Duplantis, 2012 WL 2369348, at *2–3; infra notes 112–116 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana’s 2012 decision in Duplantis v. 
Northrop Grumman). See generally Grubart, 513 U.S. at 534 (describing the connection element). 
 93 Compare infra notes 94–98 and accompanying text (outlining the concurrences in Sisson and 
Grubart), with infra notes 99–111 and accompanying text (discussing the lower court decisions). 
Although these courts do not explicitly cite the Sisson and Grubart concurrences, the courts’ holdings 
follow their reasoning. Compare infra notes 94–98 and accompanying text, with infra notes 99–111 
and accompanying text. 
 94 See Grubart, 513 U.S. at 552–53, 555 (Thomas, J., concurring) (opining that the connection 
test is unnecessary for vessels and, thus, to establish admiralty jurisdiction in cases involving vessels, 
a court should only have to conduct the locality test); Sisson, 497 U.S. at 374 (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(arguing that to establish admiralty jurisdiction, a court should simply inquire whether the tort oc-
curred on a vessel on navigable water); id. at 375 (quoting Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 
U.S. 403, 426 (1916) (Holmes, J., concurring)).  
 95 See Grubart, 513 U.S. at 552, 555 (Thomas, J., concurring); Sisson, 497 U.S. at 374 (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
 96 See 497 U.S. at 368, 374 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 97 See id. 
 98 Id. at 368 (reasoning that although the Supreme Court applied the substantial relationship test 
in the 1982 case Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, which involved a collision between two pleasure 
vessels, the Court was only demonstrating why all torts involving vessels on navigable water satisfy 
the significant relationship test). 
 99 See Belle of Orleans, 535 F.3d at 1305–06, 1313; De La Rosa, 474 F.3d at 186–88; Miles 792 
F. Supp. 2d at 920–21, 924; infra notes 100–111 and accompanying text (discussing these lower court 
decisions). 
 100 See 474 F.3d at 186–88. 
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cifically occur on a vessel to grant admiralty jurisdiction.101 In De La Rosa, a 
patron who fell and was injured on a permanently moored floating casino could 
not establish admiralty jurisdiction because the casino was not a vessel.102 Deny-
ing admiralty jurisdiction in this case did not comport with the Sisson-Grubart 
test.103  
Similarly, in 2011, in Miles v. VT Halter Marine, Inc., the U.S. District 
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana denied admiralty jurisdiction to an 
injured barge worker’s estate despite the tort occurring on navigable water be-
cause the tort did not involve a vessel.104 The court acknowledged the plaintiffs’ 
contention that they only needed to show that the tort occurred on navigable wa-
ter to satisfy the location element.105 Yet, without refuting the plaintiffs’ argu-
ment, the court only analyzed whether the barge was a vessel and held that the 
uncompleted barge was not a vessel.106 
At least one court has crafted yet another approach: first analyzing whether 
the tort involved a vessel, and then, only if the tort involved a vessel, proceeding 
to apply the locality test to confirm that the tort occurred on navigable water.107 
In 2008, in Board of Commissioners v. M/V Belle of Orleans, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the court had admiralty jurisdiction 
over the plaintiff’s in personam tort claims because the tort was caused by a ves-
sel on navigable water.108 The Belle of Orleans court did not completely disre-
gard the Supreme Court’s test for admiralty jurisdiction because it did not deny 
admiralty jurisdiction.109 But, by analyzing whether the tort occurred on naviga-
ble water and whether the tort occurred on a vessel, the Belle of Orleans court 
                                                                                                                           
 101 See id.  
 102 See id. The floating casino was permanently moored in the navigable waters of Lake Charles, 
Louisiana. Id. at 186. Both the casino’s alleged negligent act of failing to secure the carpeting and the 
victim’s injury occurred on the floating casino. Id. 
 103 Robertson, supra note 23, at 145–47 (noting that De La Rosa’s holding does not appear to 
comport with the Supreme Court’s test for admiralty jurisdiction and that suits similar to De La Rosa 
have traditionally established admiralty jurisdiction despite not involving a vessel). Compare Grubart, 
513 U.S. at 534 (indicating that the location requirement for admiralty jurisdiction is satisfied when 
either an injury occurring on land was caused by a vessel on navigable water or a tort—cause and 
injury—occurred on navigable water), and Sisson, 497 U.S. at 360–61 (same), with De La Rosa, 474 
F.3d at 186–88 (rejecting admiralty jurisdiction based on the fact that a tort occurring on navigable 
water did not involve a vessel).  
 104 See 792 F. Supp. 2d at 920–21, 924. 
 105 Id. at 921. 
 106 Id. at 921, 924. 
 107 See Belle of Orleans, 535 F.3d at 1305–06, 1313.  
 108 Id. at 1305, 1313. The plaintiff sued in personam against the casino boat owner and in rem 
against the casino boat itself. Id. at 1305. The court reasoned that both the in rem and in personam 
suits required a vessel to establish admiralty jurisdiction. Id. In addition to finding that the locality 
element was satisfied, the court also found that the connection element was satisfied. See id. at 1313. 
 109 See id. 
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undermined the Sisson-Grubart test.110 The court undermined the Sisson-
Grubart test because Sisson and Grubart established that the primary test should 
be whether the tort occurred on navigable water and that courts should only in-
quire as to whether the injury was caused by a vessel on navigable water if the 
injury occurred on land.111 
Finally, at least one lower court has further distorted the Sisson-Grubart test 
for admiralty jurisdiction by holding that the connection element cannot be satis-
fied if the watercraft upon which the tort occurred does not qualify as a vessel.112 
In 2012, in Duplantis v. Northrop Grumman, the U.S. District Court for the 
Western District of Louisiana held that an injured vessel repairman could not 
establish admiralty jurisdiction because the watercraft on which the plaintiff was 
working was under construction and therefore was not a vessel.113 The court was 
faithful to the Sisson-Grubart test in terms of the location element by finding 
that it was satisfied due to the tort having occurred on navigable waters.114 Nev-
ertheless, the court denied admiralty jurisdiction.115 The court reasoned that be-
cause the watercraft was not a vessel, the plaintiff could not establish a connec-
tion to traditional maritime activities.116 
III. SAVING MARITIME COMMERCE: A TEST FOR ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION 
THAT REQUIRES THE INVOLVEMENT OF A VESSEL DOES NOT  
PROTECT MARITIME COMMERCE 
This Part argues that a vessel requirement not only violates the Supreme 
Court and Congress’s intent behind the current two-part test for admiralty juris-
diction, but it also inadequately protects maritime commerce.117 Neither the lo-
                                                                                                                           
 110 Compare Grubart, 513 U.S. at 534 (indicating that the location requirement for admiralty 
jurisdiction is satisfied when either an injury occurring on land was caused by a vessel on navigable 
water or a tort—cause and injury—occurred on navigable water), and Sisson, 497 U.S. at 360–61 
(same), with Belle of Orleans, 535 F.3d at 1305–06, 1313 (requiring first that a vessel was involved in 
the tort and only then proceeding to conduct the remainder of the location test). 
 111 See supra note 110. 
 112 Compare Grubart, 513 U.S. at 534 (holding that to satisfy the connection element, the tort 
must be of the type that would potentially interfere with maritime commerce and that the general 
character of the activity giving rise to the incident must bear a substantial relationship with traditional 
maritime activity), and Sisson, 497 U.S. at 361–67 (same), with Duplantis, 2012 WL 2369348, at *2–
3 (reading a vessel requirement into the general Sisson-Grubart connection element). Notably, the 
Grubart and Sisson courts did not narrow the connection element by suggesting that a vessel would be 
required. See Grubart, 513 U.S. at 534; Sisson, 497 U.S. at 361–67. Quite the opposite, the Sisson 
Court tellingly adopted a broad test for assessing whether the activity involved bears a substantial 
relationship with traditional maritime activity. See 497 U.S. at 364–65. 
 113 2012 WL 2369348, at *3. 
 114 See id. at *2. 
 115 See id. at *3. 
 116 See id. at *2–3. 
 117 See infra notes 118–172 and accompanying text. 
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cality element nor the connection element of the Supreme Court and Congress’s 
two-part admiralty jurisdiction test has ever required a vessel’s involvement to 
establish admiralty jurisdiction.118 The location element does not require a vessel 
to be involved unless the injury occurred on land.119 Additionally, the Supreme 
Court has never held that the tort or the activity giving rise to the tort must in-
volve a vessel to satisfy the connection element.120 The Supreme Court and 
Congress’s decision not to impose a vessel requirement comports with admiralty 
law’s mission to protect maritime commerce, recognizing that torts not involving 
vessels can also affect maritime commerce.121 
Section A of this Part explains that a vessel test thwarts Congress’s intent 
regarding admiralty jurisdiction by violating the spirit of the 1948 Act.122 Section 
B then notes that a vessel-based test improperly forces judges to decide an issue 
of fact at the outset of litigation.123 Section C explains that some maritime com-
merce participants do not interact with vessels and thus are inadequately protect-
ed under a vessel requirement.124 Next, Section D examines certain operations 
on navigable waters that may not involve vessels or involve maritime commerce 
but still require admiralty law’s protection.125 Finally, Section E discusses possi-
ble courses of action for Congress or the Supreme Court to ensure that lower 
courts do not continue to impose a vessel requirement for establishing admiralty 
jurisdiction.126 
                                                                                                                           
 118 See Robertson, supra note 23, at 145–47; Robertson & Sturley, supra note 14, at 489; see also 
46 U.S.C. § 30101 (2006) (failing to impose a vessel requirement for admiralty jurisdiction unless an 
injury occurs on land); Grubart v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 534 (1995) (same); 
Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 360–67 (1990) (same); Exec. Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 
409 U.S. 249, 268 (1972) (same).  
 119 See 46 U.S.C. § 30101; Grubart, 513 U.S. at 534; Adams, supra note 48, at 169. 
 120 See Grubart, 513 U.S. at 534; Sisson, 497 U.S. at 360–67; Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 
457 U.S. 668, 673, 677 (1982); Exec. Jet, 409 U.S. at 268. 
 121 Compare Robertson & Sturley, supra note 14, at 489 (illustrating that the modern admiralty 
jurisdiction test does not require a vessel), Robertson, supra note 23, at 145–47 (same), Grubart, 513 
U.S. at 534 (stating the modern admiralty jurisdiction test), and Sisson, 497 U.S. at 360–67 (same), 
with Foremost, 457 U.S. at 674–77 (explaining that admiralty law’s “primary focus” is to protect 
maritime commerce and noting that maritime commerce can be disrupted by maritime commercial 
activities that do not involve a vessel). 
 122 See infra notes 127–133 and accompanying text.  
 123 See infra notes 134–141 and accompanying text.  
 124 See infra notes 142–152 and accompanying text. 
 125 See infra notes 153–165 and accompanying text. 
 126 See infra notes 166–172 and accompanying text. 
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A. Preserving Congress’s Intent: A Vessel Requirement Violates  
the Spirit of the 1948 Act 
An admiralty jurisdiction test that requires that the tort involve a vessel vio-
lates the spirit of the 1948 Act.127 Prior to the 1948 Act, parties only had to show 
that the tort occurred on navigable water to establish admiralty jurisdiction.128 
After the 1948 Act, the parties were given two options: establish that the tort—
meaning the tortious act and the injury—occurred on navigable water, or—if the 
injury occurred on land—show that a vessel on navigable water caused the inju-
ry.129 If Congress wanted to restrict admiralty jurisdiction to torts involving ves-
sels, Congress could have passed legislation requiring all claims in admiralty to 
involve a vessel.130 Congress, however, specifically did not limit admiralty juris-
diction to suits involving vessels.131 Even after the 1948 Act, the default test re-
mained whether the tort occurred on navigable water, and lower courts only had 
                                                                                                                           
 127 Compare Cleveland Terminal & Valley R.R., 208 U.S. 316, 320 (1908) (describing the Su-
preme Court’s traditional locality test as noted in the 1865 case The Plymouth, which required that a 
tort occurred on navigable waters—notably without mention of a vessel requirement), and The Admi-
ral Peoples, 295 U.S. 649, 652–53 (1935) (discussing how a literal application of The Plymout’s local-
ity test often produced inequitable results by failing to recognize admiralty jurisdiction where it was 
logically due), with Grubart, 513 U.S. at 531–32 (indicating that the 1948 Act was designed to expand 
The Plymouth’s locality requirement to admiralty jurisdiction, not to abolish, replace, or narrow it), 
and Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 260 (same). Evidence of Congress’s intent to leave admiralty jurisdic-
tion open to non-vessel torts also appears in the Suits in Admiralty Act (“SAA”), which waives the 
United States’ sovereign immunity for admiralty suits. See Ayers v. United States, 277 F.3d 821, 827 
(6th Cir. 2002) (explaining that SAA suits do not require a vessel’s involvement); cf. 46 U.S.C. 
§ 30903(a) (2006) (declining to require vessel involvement). See generally Dominguez v. United 
States, No. 03 CV.2206(TPG), 2004 WL 691251, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2004) (noting that the 
United States can only be sued if Congress has waived sovereign immunity but that Congress waived 
sovereign immunity for admiralty claims through the SAA). The SAA waives immunity “[i]n a case 
in which, if a vessel were privately owned or operated, or if cargo were privately owned or possessed, 
or if a private person or property were involved, a civil action in admiralty could be maintained.” 46 
U.S.C. § 30903 (emphasis added). The SAA requires a court to have admiralty jurisdiction for a plain-
tiff to bring an SAA suit, but the SAA also explicitly provides relief for suits not involving vessels. 
Ayers, 277 F.3d at 827; see 46 U.S.C. § 30903. If Congress had envisioned a vessel requirement, then 
it would have envisioned nullifying most of the SAA. See 46 U.S.C. § 30903; Ayers, 277 F.3d at 827 
(denying the appellant’s claim that the SAA requires a vessel and noting that the statute’s plain lan-
guage does not require a vessel if admiralty jurisdiction can be established). 
 128 See Grubart, 513 U.S. at 531–32, 534; The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20, 35–37 (1865), 
superseded by statute, Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, Pub. L. No. 80-695, 62 Stat. 496, 496 
(1948) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. § 30101 (2006)). 
 129 Grubart, 513 U.S. at 531–32, 534 (providing for this two-part locality test); see 62 Stat. at 
496. 
 130 Cf. 46 U.S.C. § 30101 (providing an example of Congress passing a statute to redefine admi-
ralty jurisdiction); Gebhard v. S.S. Hawaiian Legislator, 425 F.2d 1303, 1309 (1970) (discussing the 
1948 Act and noting that Congress did not intend to legislate in areas it did not explicitly address in 
the statute). 
 131 See 46 U.S.C. § 30101. 
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to inquire as to whether a vessel caused the injury if it occurred on land.132 In 
conflict with the 1948 Act’s purpose of expanding admiralty jurisdiction, a test 
that requires a tort to involve a vessel on navigable water in every instance nar-
rows admiralty jurisdiction.133 
B. Vessel Determinations Are Issues of Fact Best Preserved for Trial  
Beyond upsetting the Supreme Court and Congress’s system for establish-
ing admiralty jurisdiction, a vessel requirement forces a judge, at the outset of 
litigation to resolve a question of fact usually reserved for the fact finder—
whether the object involved in the tort was a vessel.134 Deciding whether a wa-
tercraft is a vessel is a fact-intensive inquiry that should be left to the fact finder 
after each party has had the opportunity to present its full case.135 Fact-intensive 
inquiries are often complicated and extensive and should not be included in a 
                                                                                                                           
 132 See Grubart, 513 U.S. at 534; De La Rosa v. St. Charles Gaming Co., 474 F.3d 185, 187 (5th 
Cir. 2006); Robertson, supra note 23, at 145–47; Robertson & Sturley, supra note 14, at 489. 
 133 Compare Grubart, 513 U.S. at 531–32 (indicating that the 1948 Act was designed to expand 
The Plymouth’s locality requirement for admiralty jurisdiction to include vessels on navigable water 
that cause injury on land, and suggesting that the 1948 Act did not abolish, replace, or narrow the 
locality test under The Plymouth, which granted admiralty jurisdiction to all tortious acts occurring on 
navigable water), and Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 260 (same), with De La Rosa, 474 F.3d at 186–88 
(denying admiralty jurisdiction despite the tort occurring wholly on navigable water because its loca-
tion—a floating casino—was not a vessel). 
 134 See Pederson v. Powell-Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 2d 915, 920 (D.N.J. 1999) (not-
ing that juries should decide whether or not a vessel was in navigation); Hartley v. City of New York, 
621 N.Y.S.2d 789, 795 (Sup. Ct. 1994) (explaining that whether a barge was a vessel is a question of 
fact). Many claims in substantive maritime law require a vessel’s involvement in the tort, such as 
claims of unseaworthiness and claims under the Jones Act or the Longshoreman and Harbor Workers’ 
Compensation Act. See Longshoreman and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) 
(2006) (compensating injured maritime workers and allowing workers to bring suits against vessels 
and vessel owners for negligence); 46 U.S.C. § 10908 (2006) (providing victims with a claim for un-
seaworthiness if a vessel is not fit for its intended use); Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2006 & Supp. 
V 2011) (providing a cause of action for injured seaman against the seaman’s employer, but requiring 
that the individual’s work further a vessel’s purpose to qualify as a seaman). Yet, even for these 
claims, courts have traditionally held that parties do not have to prove vessel status at the outset of 
litigation because vessel status is a question of fact. See Pederson, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 919–20 (holding 
that it was for the jury to decide whether an injured diver was diving from a vessel and, therefore, 
could qualify as a seaman); Hartley, 621 N.Y.S.2d at 793–95 (noting that the court had admiralty 
jurisdiction under the locality and connection test but leaving it to the jury to decide whether a vessel 
was involved for purposes of the plaintiff’s Longshoreman and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act 
claims).  
 135 See Pederson, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 920; Hartley, 621 N.Y.S.2d at 795; see also Lozman v. City 
of Riviera Beach, 133 S. Ct. 735, 739, 741, 744 (2013) (providing a fact-based test to determine 
whether a watercraft qualifies as a vessel); supra note 134 and accompanying text (explaining that 
vessel status is an issue of fact for the jury and discussing how, for this very reason, courts typically 
do not require vessel status to be proven at the outset, even for claims that require a vessel). 
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jurisdictional analysis because they should be quick and simple so litigation may 
get underway.136  
The fact-specific and intensive nature of the vessel inquiry became even 
more pronounced in the 2013 case Lozman v. City of Riveria Beach, where the 
Supreme Court adopted a “reasonable observer test” for classifying watercrafts 
as vessels.137 Under Lozman’s reasonable observer test, an object is a vessel if a 
reasonable observer, after analyzing the object’s physical characteristics and ac-
tivities, decides that the object can practically transport people or things on wa-
ter.138 A reasonable observer should consider a multitude of facts when deciding 
whether the object constitutes a practical means of transportation.139 Specifically, 
a reasonable observer should note whether the object was capable of self-
propulsion, steering, and storing electricity; whether the object’s rooms looked 
like maritime berths; and whether the object was in fact being used for transpor-
tation.140 Given the ambiguous and numerous criteria a court must consider un-
der Lozman’s test, a judge cannot be expected to weigh all of these elements at 
the start of every litigation—before sufficient facts have been presented—to de-
termine admiralty jurisdiction.141  
                                                                                                                           
 136 See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 599 U.S. 77, 94 (2010) (discussing the need for simplicity in juris-
dictional analyses); Sisson, 497 U.S. at 378 (Scalia, J., concurring) (warning about the risks of a cum-
bersome jurisdictional test (quoting Hanover Star Milling Co., v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 426 (1916) 
(Holmes, J., concurring))); id. (remarking that uncertain jurisdictional tests have the potential for 
wasting judicial resources: “judges [may] be misled into trying lengthy cases and laboriously reaching 
decisions which do not bind anybody”). 
 137 See 133 S. Ct. at 739, 741. Congress has defined a vessel as “every description of watercraft or 
other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on wa-
ter.” 1 U.S.C. § 3 (2012). Prior to Lozman, a watercraft only had to be used, or capable of being used, 
as water transportation to qualify as a vessel. Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 543 U.S. 481, 495, 497 
(2005). The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Lozman to resolve the circuit split regarding whether 
an owner’s intent should be considered when deciding whether a watercraft was used, or capable of 
being used, as water transportation. Compare City of Riviera Beach v. That Certain Unnamed Gray, 
Two Story Vessel Approximately Fifty-Seven Feet in Length, 649 F.3d 1259, 1267 (11th Cir. 2011) 
(rejecting a subjective inquiry into the owner’s intent regarding the watercraft when determining 
whether the watercraft was a vessel), rev’d sub nom. Lozman, 133 S. Ct. 735, and Bd. of Comm’rs v. 
M/V Belle of Orleans, 535 F.3d 1299, 1311 (11th Cir. 2008) (disregarding the watercraft owner’s 
intent when deciding whether a watercraft was a vessel), abrogated by Lozman, 133 S. Ct. 735, with 
De La Rosa, 474 F.3d at 187 (considering a moored casino owner’s intent to never sail the watercraft 
again to hold that the casino was not a vessel), Tagliere v. Harrah’s Ill. Corp., 445 F.3d 1012, 1014, 
1016 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting that a watercraft is not a vessel if it is permanently moored and the owner 
never intends to sail the craft), and La. Int’l Marine, L.L.C. v. Drilling Rig Atlas Century, C.A. No. 
C–11–186, 2012 WL 4718558, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 21, 2012) (allowing for a subjective inquiry into 
the owner’s intent when determining a rig’s vessel status). 
 138 See 133 S. Ct. at 739, 746 (applying the reasonable observer test to a floating home to hold 
that the watercraft was not a vessel). 
 139 See id. at 739, 741, 746. 
 140 See id. 
 141 See id.; supra notes 40, 134–136 and accompanying text (discussing the need for simple and 
quick jurisdictional tests).  
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C. Forms of Maritime Commerce That Do Not Involve Vessels Still Require 
Special Protection Under Admiralty Law 
Additionally, a test for admiralty jurisdiction that requires a tort to involve a 
vessel would exclude types of maritime commerce that do not involve vessels.142 
These types of maritime commerce still need special protection under admiralty 
law, so in this respect, a vessel requirement test would not further admiralty ju-
risdiction’s purpose of protecting maritime commerce.143 A jurisdictional test 
that requires the existence of a vessel would be particularly problematic for pro-
fessional SCUBA divers, such as underwater construction workers.144 Because 
professional divers do not always use vessels, a vessel requirement would deny 
them the protections admiralty jurisdiction provides.145 
                                                                                                                           
 142 See infra notes 143–152 (discussing types of maritime commerce that do not involve vessels). 
 143 See McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 354 (1991) (recognizing that seamen 
require special protection because of “the special hazards and disadvantages” they encounter); Fore-
most, 457 U.S. at 674 (explaining that admiralty jurisdiction’s purpose is to protect maritime com-
merce); infra notes 144–152 and accompanying text (discussing various maritime commerce partici-
pants that do not use vessels and arguing that denying admiralty jurisdiction to these participants 
harms maritime commerce). 
 144 See Coleman, supra note 13, at 537 n.126. See generally infra note 145 (illustrating how un-
derwater construction divers will otherwise typically satisfy admiralty jurisdiction). Additionally, 
some professional SCUBA divers participate in marine tourism—another form of maritime com-
merce—by teaching SCUBA lessons or conducting SCUBA tours. See Coleman, supra note 13, at 
520, 533–37. 
 145 See Coleman, supra note 13, at 537 n.126 (stating that some divers enter the water from the 
shore). Conversely, most professional SCUBA divers can satisfy the Sisson-Grubart test for admiralty 
jurisdiction. See Pederson, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 916–30; Hartley, 621 N.Y.S.2d at 791, 793–95. For 
example, the most common diver injuries involve underwater injury, so the location element should 
be readily satisfied under the Sisson-Grubart test. See Coleman, supra note 13, 538–41, 544 (discuss-
ing various underwater injuries divers may contract and noting that “[p]laintiffs in diving cases rarely 
have trouble meeting prerequisites for admiralty jurisdiction, particularly given the relaxed standards 
adopted by the Supreme Court in [Grubart]”); cf. Grubart, 513 U.S. at 534 (describing the location 
element); Sisson, 497 U.S. at 360–61 (same). Similarly, many professional divers can easily satisfy 
the first prong of the connection element. See Hartley, 621 N.Y.S.2d at 793–94 (holding that injured 
divers could potentially disrupt maritime commerce); Coleman, supra note 13, at 544. Finally, many 
commercial divers can easily satisfy the second prong of the connection element, which requires the 
activity leading to the tort to have a significant relationship to traditional maritime activities. See 
Coleman, supra note 13, at 544; see also Pederson, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 918–19 (holding that a construc-
tion diver’s work was substantially related to traditionally maritime activities); Hartley, 621 N.Y.S.2d 
at 794 (noting that underwater construction is “certainly” substantially related to traditional maritime 
activity). For example, in 1994, in Hartley v. City of New York, the Supreme Court of Kings County in 
New York held that admiralty jurisdiction applied under the Sisson-Grubart test to a professional 
diver who was injured while installing a sewage pipe in New York Harbor. See 621 N.Y.S.2d at 791–
94. The diver may not, however, have been able to establish admiralty jurisdiction if the court had 
required the tort to involve a vessel because there was an issue of fact as to whether the watercraft that 
was involved qualified as a vessel. See id. at 795 (holding that whether a watercraft was a vessel did 
not bear on admiralty jurisdiction, but was rather a question of fact to be resolved at trial). Similarly, 
in 1999, in Pederson v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., the U.S. District Court for the District of New 
Jersey applied the Sisson-Grubart test and held that a professional diver who was injured while diving 
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As participators in maritime commerce, professional SCUBA divers need 
protection under admiralty law.146 Divers face unique perils in their profession, 
like the bends—also known as decompression sickness—which is a common 
diver ailment.147 Divers may also suffer from nitrogen narcosis, squeeze, pneu-
mothorax, arrhythmias, hypothermia, and other ailments.148 State laws may not 
provide adequate remedies to professional divers injured while participating in 
maritime commerce, so—absent admiralty jurisdiction—divers may not be ade-
quately compensated for their injuries.149 For example, admiralty law provides 
remedies for these injuries that state laws do not offer, such as more causes of 
action, longer statutes of limitations, and different defenses.150 If professional 
divers are not protected from the unique perils they face, like the bends, the risks 
of diving increase.151 If diving becomes more hazardous, fewer people will be 
willing to enter the profession, and the costs of hiring professional divers will 
rise, thus increasing the costs of maritime commerce involving divers.152  
                                                                                                                           
from a floating platform had established admiralty jurisdiction. See 34 F. Supp. 2d at 916–20 (noting 
that whether the floating platform was a vessel was not a factor for determining jurisdiction, but rather 
a question of fact for the fact finder to decide at trial).  
 146 Compare Paré, supra note 28, at 201–02 (observing that admiralty jurisdiction was established 
to promote and protect maritime commerce), and Perry, supra note 28, at 823–25 (discussing the 
importance of maritime commerce to the United States’ economy), with Coleman, supra note 13, at 
519 (noting that SCUBA diving is a billion dollar industry). Compare McDermott, 498 U.S. at 354 
(recognizing that seamen require special protection because of “the special hazards and disad-
vantages” they encounter), with Coleman, supra note 13, at 538–42 (discussing the unique health 
issues that SCUBA divers face). 
 147 See Hartley, 621 N.Y.S.2d at 792 (discussing a plaintiff contracting the bends); Coleman, 
supra note 13, at 538–39. See generally McDermott, 498 U.S. at 354 (recognizing that seamen require 
special protection because of “the special hazards and disadvantages” they encounter). When divers 
breathe underwater, nitrogen builds up in their blood. Coleman, supra note 13, at 539. The bends 
occurs when too much nitrogen builds up in the body and causes bubbles to form in the diver’s blood. 
Id. The bends can cause itching, vomiting, rashes, fatigue, muscle weakness and pain, paralysis, 
numbness, convulsions, and death. Id. 
 148 Coleman, supra note 13, at 540–42. Nitrogen narcosis causes symptoms similar to drinking 
excessive amounts of alcohol. Id. at 540 & n.142. Squeeze occurs when external pressures cause pain 
in internal air spaces (such as in a diver’s ears, teeth, and nose). Id. at 541. Pneumothorax occurs when 
divers surface too fast without breathing, causing the air in their lungs to expand and potentially rup-
turing their lungs. Id. An arrhythmia is an irregular heart rhythm; even divers that do not have irregu-
lar heart patterns on land can suffer from heart ailments during dives. Id. at 542. Hypothermia is a 
severe drop in body heat; divers are particular susceptible because water depletes the body of heat 
faster than air. Id.  
 149 See supra notes 33–36 and accompanying text (explaining that certain remedies are only 
available under admiralty law, meaning that if a court denies admiralty jurisdiction, an injured party 
may be without a remedy); see also Coleman, supra note 13, at 556 (noting that general maritime law 
has evolved to protect divers). 
 150 See supra notes 33–36 and accompanying text; Coleman, supra note 13, at 556 (discussing 
admiralty law’s application to SCUBA divers). 
 151 See Hartley, 621 N.Y.S.2d at 793–94. 
 152 See id. 
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D. Operations on Navigable Waters Outside of Maritime Commerce  
Can Still Affect Maritime Commerce and Thus Require  
Protection Under Admiralty Law 
A test for admiralty jurisdiction that requires a vessel’s involvement also 
excludes some groups that do not participate in—but still influence—maritime 
commerce.153 Admiralty law was created to protect maritime commerce.154 The 
Supreme Court has acknowledged that individuals not participating in maritime 
commerce can still adversely affect maritime commerce and, therefore, should 
fall within the reach of admiralty law.155 As such, admiralty law developed to 
address operations on navigable waters outside of maritime commerce that may 
still affect maritime commerce.156 
The Sisson-Grubart test protects operations on navigable waters that ad-
versely affect maritime commerce, even if such operations are outside maritime 
commerce and do not involve a vessel.157 For example, the test protects maritime 
rescue operations, including those of the U.S. Coast Guard, which often do not 
involve maritime commerce or vessels.158 Because these operations can disrupt 
                                                                                                                           
 153 See infra notes 154–164 and accompanying text (discussing these groups and their effects on 
maritime commerce). 
 154 See Foremost, 457 U.S. at 674–75, 677; Paré, supra note 28, at 201–02; Perry, supra note 28, 
at 823–25. 
 155 Foremost, 457 U.S. at 674–75 (“The federal interest in protecting maritime commerce cannot 
be adequately served if admiralty jurisdiction is restricted to those individuals actually engaged in 
commercial maritime activity.”); see Sisson, 497 U.S. at 367; Price v. Price, 929 F.2d 131, 133 (4th 
Cir. 1991) (synthesizing Supreme Court admiralty jurisprudence); Paré, supra note 28, at 202. 
 156 See Foremost, 457 U.S. at 674–75; Paré, supra note 28, at 201–02. See generally infra notes 
157–165 (discussing how admiralty law addresses negligent rescues by the U.S. Coast Guard). 
 157 See Grubart, 513 U.S. at 534 (imposing a location element and a connection element, neither 
of which exclusively require direct involvement in maritime commerce or the involvement of a ves-
sel); Sisson, 497 U.S. at 360–67 (same); see also supra notes 79–85 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the Sisson-Grubart test in more detail); supra note 118 and accompanying text (providing further 
support for the proposition that the current test for admiralty jurisdiction does not require a vessel). 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has even gone so far as to hold that swimmers could 
disrupt maritime commerce and accordingly satisfy the Sisson-Grubart test for admiralty jurisdiction. 
See Ayers, 277 F.3d at 826–28 (holding that the claims brought by the estate of a drowned swimmer 
against the United States for negligently operating a lock established admiralty jurisdiction under 
Sisson and Grubart). 
 158 See Kelly v. United States, 531 F.2d 1144, 1147–48 (2d Cir. 1975); Dominguez, 2004 WL 
69251, at *2; Crowder v. United States, No. 4:00CV048, 2000 WL 33342288, at *6 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 18, 
2000). Although each of these cases involved vessels, the courts recognized that admiralty jurisdiction 
would still be proper if vessels were not present. See Kelly, 531 F.2d at 1147–48 (observing that the 
case only “tangentially” involved vessels and noting that admiralty jurisdiction would still exist if the 
victim were a swimmer rather than a boater); Dominguez, 2004 WL 691251, at *2 (holding that the 
suit arose in admiralty without discussing the vessel’s involvement); Crowder, 2000 WL 33342288, at 
*4, *6 (noting that the locality element of the Sisson-Grubart test did not require a vessel’s involve-
ment in the tort). The Coast Guard is only authorized to execute operations on the high seas and over 
waters that the United States has jurisdiction, 14 U.S.C. § 88(a) (2012), so the locality element of the 
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maritime commerce, admiralty law has developed to address tort claims arising 
from negligent maritime rescues.159 
Federal courts clearly have admiralty jurisdiction over torts when either the 
Coast Guard or those being rescued were operating a vessel.160 Under a vessel 
requirement test, however, federal courts would not have admiralty jurisdiction 
over torts when neither the Coast Guard nor the victims were using a vessel.161 
And absent admiralty jurisdiction, victims of negligent rescue by the Coast 
Guard are without a remedy because state courts cannot hear suits against the 
Coast Guard and the Coast Guard can only be sued in federal courts when admi-
ralty jurisdiction is present.162 This is because, as an agent of the United States, 
the Coast Guard can only be sued if Congress has waived sovereign immuni-
ty.163 Congress has provided a limited waiver of sovereign immunity against the 
                                                                                                                           
Sisson-Grubart test is usually readily satisfied. See Dominguez, 2004 WL 691251, at *2. Furthermore, 
many courts have established the general principle that the Coast Guard’s operations are a traditional 
maritime activity and that negligence in executing an operation could potentially disrupt maritime 
commerce. See Kelly, 531 F.2d at 1148 (stating that in regard to the Coast Guard, “[i]t would be im-
possible to find an agency of our government with a closer relationship to maritime activity”); 
Dominguez, 2004 WL 691251, at *2 (discussing the Coast Guard’s relationship with maritime com-
merce); Crowder, 2000 WL 33342288, at *6 (discussing the potential disruption of maritime com-
merce resulting from the Coast Guard’s maritime arrests). 
 159 See Kelly, 531 F.2d at 1147–48; Dominguez, 2004 WL 691251, at *2; Crowder, 2000 WL 
33342288, at *6. Negligent Coast Guard rescues threaten maritime commerce because they can result 
in prolonged disruptions of navigation while the rescue is underway. See Crowder, 2000 WL 
33342288, at *6. Additionally, water rescues not involving the Coast Guard also have the potential to 
disrupt maritime commerce and, thus, similarly fall within admiralty jurisdiction even if a vessel is not 
involved. See Roane v. Greenwich Swim Comm., 330 F. Supp. 2d 306, 308, 313–15 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 
(holding that an injured swimmer’s causes of action against a private vessel rescuer arose in admiralty, 
but leaving open the possibility for suits against rescuers not using vessels because neither the activity 
(life salvage) nor the tort (negligent life salvage) necessarily require a vessel in every instance). Final-
ly, suits involving malfunctioning rescue equipment can also disrupt maritime commerce and, thus, 
also need protection under admiralty law. See Icelandic Coast Guard v. United Techs. Corp., 722 F. 
Supp. 942, 943, 946 (D. Conn. 1989) (granting admiralty jurisdiction to claims involving a helicop-
ter’s crash into a fjord on Iceland’s coast and noting that objects and activities other than vessels and 
vessels’ activities can interfere with maritime commerce); see also Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallen-
tire, 477 U.S. 207, 209, 218–19 (1986) (noting that admiralty jurisdiction was proper when a helicop-
ter crashed in navigable waters while carrying offshore drilling platform workers from the platform to 
the shore because this job was traditionally performed by a waterborne vessel). 
 160 See Kelly, 531 F.2d at 1147–48; Dominguez, 2004 WL 691251, at *2; Crowder, 2000 WL 
33342288, at *6. 
 161 See Kelly, 531 F.2d at 1147–48; Dominguez, 2004 WL 691251, at *2; Crowder, 2000 WL 
33342288, at *6. 
 162 See Dominguez, 2004 WL 691251, at *1, *2. 
 163 Id.; cf. Uralde v. United States, 614 F.3d 1282, 1288 (11th Cir. 2010) (noting that agents of the 
federal government cannot be sued unless sovereign immunity has been waived); Harrell v. United 
States, 443 F.3d 1231, 1234–35, 1239 (10th Cir. 2006) (same); Cassens v. St. Louis River Cruise 
Lines, Inc., 44 F.3d 508, 510–11 (7th Cir. 1995) (same). 
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Coast Guard, but only in the case of admiralty suits.164 Thus, if plaintiffs cannot 
establish admiralty jurisdiction, they cannot sue the Coast Guard.165 
E. Saving Admiralty Jurisdiction: A Call to Congress to Pass a New Act 
Congress or the Supreme Court should act to ensure federal courts do not 
continue to unjustly deny admiralty jurisdiction to maritime torts that do not in-
volve a vessel.166 A strict application of the current two-part test for admiralty 
jurisdiction, as laid out by the Supreme Court and Congress, better protects mari-
time commerce than a vessel requirement test.167 To prevent lower courts from 
denying admiralty jurisdiction to claims lacking the involvement of a vessel, the 
Supreme Court or Congress should act to clarify the current two-part test.168 The 
Supreme Court could again address the test for admiralty jurisdiction and une-
quivocally hold that a vessel is not required.169 The best remedy, however, would 
be for Congress to pass a statute that incorporated both the 1948 Act and the Sis-
son-Grubart test into a single act.170 This new act is the best approach because it 
would eliminate the debate as to whether the 1948 Act is part of the Sisson-
Grubart test or a stand-alone test for jurisdiction, while also explicitly clarifying 
that a vessel is not required to satisfy the locality or the connection elements of 
                                                                                                                           
 164 See 46 U.S.C. § 30903(a) (2006) (waving the United States’ sovereign immunity for admiralty 
suits); supra note 127 (discussing the SAA, which waives the United States’ sovereign immunity for 
admiralty suits). 
 165 Dominguez, 2004 WL 691251, at *1, *2; see 46 U.S.C. § 30903(a).  
 166 See supra notes 86–116 and accompanying text (discussing how some lower courts require a 
vessel’s involvement to establish admiralty jurisdiction); supra notes 127–165 and accompanying text 
(arguing that a vessel requirement thwarts the Supreme Court and Congress’s intent for admiralty 
jurisdiction, forces judges to decide issues of fact at the outset of litigation, and inadequately protects 
maritime commerce). 
 167 See 46 U.S.C. § 30101 (2006); Grubart, 513 U.S. at 534; Sisson, 497 U.S. at 360–67; Paré, 
supra note 28, at 201–02 (observing that admiralty jurisdiction was established to promote and protect 
maritime commerce); supra notes 79–85 and accompanying text (discussing the Sisson-Grubart test 
in more detail); supra notes 127–165 and accompanying text (discussing the problems surrounding a 
vessel requirement). 
 168 See supra notes 86–116 and accompanying text (discussing how some lower courts require a 
vessel’s involvement to establish admiralty jurisdiction); supra notes 127–165 and accompanying text 
(arguing that a vessel requirement thwarts the Supreme Court and Congress’s intent for admiralty 
jurisdiction, forces judges to decide issues of fact at the outset of litigation, and inadequately protects 
maritime commerce). 
 169 Cf. Grubart, 513 U.S. at 534 (illustrating the Supreme Court’s capacity to influence admiralty 
jurisdiction); Sisson, 497 U.S. at 360–67 (same); Foremost, 457 U.S. at 669, 673, 677 (same); Exec. 
Jet, 409 U.S. at 268 (same); supra notes 66–85 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme 
Court’s four modern admiralty jurisdiction decisions). 
 170 See infra notes 171–172 and accompanying text; cf. 46 U.S.C. § 30101 (providing an example 
that Congress has the power to adjust the scope of admiralty jurisdiction through legislative acts). 
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the Sisson-Grubart test.171 Such an act could simply state: admiralty jurisdiction 
of the United States extends to torts that: (1) involve injuries or damage that oc-
cur on navigable water, whether involving a vessel or not, and injuries or dam-
age that occur on land that are caused by a vessel on navigable water; (2) are of 
the type that could potentially disrupt maritime commerce, whether involving a 
vessel or not; and (3) involve a type of activity that bears a substantial relation-
ship to traditional maritime activities, whether involving a vessel or not.172 
CONCLUSION 
Admiralty jurisdiction was created to protect maritime commerce and other 
traditional maritime activities. To fulfill this purpose, torts occurring on naviga-
ble waters that do not involve a vessel must be able to establish admiralty juris-
diction. The current test for admiralty jurisdiction, as expressed by the Supreme 
Court, is a two-part test that contains both a location element and a connection 
element and does not require a vessel to be involved. Despite the Supreme 
Court’s test, many lower courts have arbitrarily imposed a condition that the suit 
must involve a vessel to establish admiralty jurisdiction for in personam tort 
claims. A vessel requirement test is laden with problems. First, a vessel require-
ment violates the spirit of the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act and hin-
ders Congress’s intent for admiralty jurisdiction. Such a requirement may also 
inappropriately force a judge to render an intensive factual investigation at the 
outset of litigation. Furthermore, a vessel requirement test inadequately protects 
maritime commerce because some forms of maritime commerce, such as profes-
sional SCUBA diving, do not involve vessels. Finally, this vessel requirement 
excludes many operations outside of maritime commerce, like Coast Guard res-
cues, that may disrupt maritime commerce. Thus, to adequately protect maritime 
commerce, Congress or the Supreme Court must act to stop lower courts from 
requiring that a tort involve a vessel to establish admiralty jurisdiction for in per-
sonam tort suits. Congress, in particular, could pass a new act that would en-
                                                                                                                           
 171 See Grubart, 513 U.S. at 534 (discussing the current two-part test for admiralty jurisdiction); 
Sisson, 497 U.S. at 360–67 (same); supra note 84 (discussing this debate). Recall that this debate is 
problematic, as courts that hold the 1948 Act provides for an independent jurisdiction analysis decline 
to impose the Sisson-Grubart connection element and contribute to the creation of disunified admiral-
ty jurisdiction standards. See Robertson & Sturley, supra note 55, at 239–40. A unified test creates 
consistency in granting admiralty jurisdiction and thus promotes uniform admiralty law, which is the 
best way to protect maritime commerce. See Burrell, supra note 37 at 69 (explaining that uniform 
admiralty law best protects maritime commerce); Perry, supra note 28, at 824 (same); Rue, supra note 
37, at 1147 (same). 
 172 See supra notes 86–116 and accompanying text (discussing how some lower courts require a 
vessel’s involvement to establish admiralty jurisdiction); supra notes 127–165 and accompanying text 
(illustrating the need for clarification that admiralty jurisdiction does not require the involvement of a 
vessel).  
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compass previous legislation and explicitly extend admiralty jurisdiction to ap-
plicable torts not involving a vessel. Such an act could save admiralty jurisdic-
tion from sinking into the abyss. 
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